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A smart contract is a computer program which allows users to define and execute transactions automatically
on top of the blockchain platform. Given the significance of smart contracts in supporting important activities
across industry sectors including supply chain, finance, legal and medical services, there is a strong demand
for verification and validation techniques. Yet, the vast majority of smart contracts lack any kind of formal
specification, which is essential for establishing their correctness. In this survey, we investigate formal models
and specifications of smart contracts presented in the literature and present a systematic overview in order
to understand the common trends. We also discuss the current approaches used in verifying such property
specifications and identify gaps with the hope to recognize promising directions for future work.
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1 INTRODUCTION
A proposal to store timestamped tamper-resistant information in cryptographically secure chained
blocks has gradually evolved from 1991 into what we now know as blockchain: a distributed ledger
shared between nodes of a peer-to-peer network following a certain consensus protocol, and
one of the fastest-growing technologies of the modern time. The blockchain technology owes its
initial popularity to Bitcoin [150], which appeared in 2008. Later, Ethereum [209] started the era
of Blockchain 2.0 and expanded the capabilities and applications of blockchain by introducing
smart contracts—computer programs executed on top of blockchain. Each contract is associated
with an address, a balance, and a piece of executable code. The functions in a contract can be
invoked via transaction messages sent from platform users. Most of the smart contracts are written
in Turing-complete languages, such as Solidity [6].
The market cap of the Ethereum cryptocurrency was worth $20 billion as of February 1, 2020, and
several hundred of thousands of transactions are processed each day [5]. Unfortunately, the adoption
of blockchain and smart contracts is also accompanied by severe attacks, often due to domain-
specific security pitfalls in the smart contract implementations. Examples include stealth of Ether
through notorious attacks on the DAO [181] and Parity Multisig Wallet [120], as well as the freezing
of users’ funds in the same Parity Multisig Wallet [190] and the King of the Ether Throne [1] smart
contracts. Extensive research has been done over the past several years—by technology giants,
non-profit organizations, and the research community—on the techniques for verifying smart
contract correctness. In this survey, we review the recent advances in the applications of formal
methods in the analysis of smart contracts, with a focus on the domain-specific properties and
various formalisms supporting the specification and verification of such properties.
We organize the paper following a structure outlined in Fig. 1. Formal verification proves or
disproves the correctness of a system by checking the formal (mathematical) model of the system
against a certain formal specification. A specification is a set of properties describing the desired
behaviors of a smart contract, usually defined by developers’ intention. Models and specifications
can be defined at different levels of abstraction via various types of formalisms, which we overview
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Fig. 1. Organization of the paper.
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Fig. 2. Search queries used in Google Scholar.
in Sects. 2 and 3, respectively. Section 3 additionally describes a taxonomy of smart contract
properties, which highlights the emerging trends in the literature. Section 4 closes the loop by
reviewing formal verification techniques utilized to prove the correctness of smart contract models
with respect to the desired properties. Finally, Sect. 5 concludes the survey with our observations
on major trends, challenges, and future directions in the formal specification and verification of
smart contracts.
1.1 Methodology
Sections 1.1 and 1.2 outline the methodology that we followed to extensively collect the existing
work related to smart contract formal specification and verification, and an overview of the body
of related works, respectively.
Research Scope. This paper is aimed to overview, analyze, and classify approaches to formal modeling
of smart contracts, specification of smart contract properties, and techniques employed in the
verification of those. The scope of the survey includes a study of common property specifications of
smart contracts, characterizing their functional correctness and security guarantees. The focus of
the survey is narrowed down to smart contract functional behavior and does not embody problems
related to other blockchain-related execution aspects, such as scalability, consensus, interaction
with IoT systems, etc. Therefore, the purpose of the paper is to provide answers to the following
research questions:
RQ1: What are the formal techniques used for modeling, specification, and verification of smart
contracts? What are the common formal requirements specified and verified by these tech-
niques?
RQ2: What are the challenges introduced by smart contract and blockchain environment in
formalizing and verifying smart contracts?
RQ3: What are the current limitations in smart contract formal specification and verification and
what research directions may be taken to overcome them?
Search Criteria. In order to provide a complete survey covering most of the publications related to
smart contract specification and verification since 2014, we created a publication repository that
includes 202 papers published from September, 2014 to June, 2020. To collect the relevant literature
for analysis, we have performed the search in Google Scholar, ACM, IEEE, and Springer databases
using the two queries shown in Fig. 2.
In October 2019, we have explored 10 pages of the results retrieved for each query and obtained
70 papers that fall into the scope of the survey and have been published since 2014. Based on
the collected set of papers, we performed snowballing and inverse snowballing to obtain a more
comprehensive view by collecting 85 more publications. Additionally, to provide an overview
of the state-of-the-art, we included another 47 recently published papers that were retrieved
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using the two aforementioned queries from October, 2019 to June, 2020 by Google Scholar at
the time of writing. Overall, we collected and studied 202 relevant papers. The majority of them
were published in the proceedings of 70 conferences and workshops (including ACM CCS, ASE,
ESEC/FSE, IEEE SANER, S&P, IEEE/ACM ICSE, NDSS, ISoLA, FC, FM, and the affiliated workshops)
or one of 13 journals (including ACM TOSEM, IEEE TSE, and IEEE Access). Using our search
methodology, we additionally identified 53 articles that conduct a survey on smart contract types,
languages, vulnerabilities, and verification techniques, or propose security and design patterns
for their development. We describe the collected articles in an online repository: https://ntu-
srslab.github.io/smart-contract-publications/.
In the presented work we do not claim to provide a complete set of properties that smart
contracts are supposed to meet. However, by means of the presented analysis and classification, we
seek to provide a firm formalized foundation and a stable structure for smart contract property
specifications, what we hope will facilitate the development of correct, secure, and standardized
smart contracts.
1.2 Related Works
By now, a multitude of surveys addressing smart contract analysis has been published. These
include a review of security vulnerabilities [24, 96, 144, 174, 213], verification approaches and
tools [53, 57, 69, 73, 77, 149, 161, 163, 216], formal specification and modeling techniques [33, 110,
182], and languages for smart contract development [101, 159]. We found several pieces of work
discussing common design patterns of smart contracts [207, 208, 210, 212], as well as studies of smart
contract platforms and practical applications [25, 32, 201, 205]. Another line of research focuses on
revealing challenges and opportunities for safer smart contract development [22, 139, 145, 221, 224].
In addition, some surveys analyze performance and scalability aspects of smart contracts [170].
The surveys most relevant to this work are concerned with the application of formal methods
to modeling smart contracts. Singh et al. [182] analyzed 35 research works on formal verification
and specification techniques as well as languages for smart contracts, together with the issues and
vulnerabilities they address. Bartoletti et al. [33] compared five formal modeling techniques for
Bitcoin smart contracts based on their expressiveness, usability, and suitability for verification.
Furthermore, Ladleif and Weske [121] proposed a framework for evaluating formal modeling tools
with respect to their capability to model a legal smart contract, and assessed eight visual tools for
smart contracts modeling using this framework. Different from the discussed works, our survey
proposes a coherent conceptual framework that helps to establish the links between the approaches
to formal modeling, specification, and verification. Besides, our analysis is more comprehensive in
terms of the types of formal techniques covered and the application platforms considered.
There has been a body of literature dedicated to the collection of both bad and good ways of
writing secure smart contracts. On one hand, the common pitfalls discovered in past experiences
should be documented and avoided in the future development; and on the other hand, the best
practices which are proven to work can be summarized and adopted when facing a similar context.
Atzei et al. [24] and some more recent work [96, 144, 174, 213] collected common vulnerability
patterns which might compromise the security of smart contracts. Permenev et al. [162] and
Bernardi et al. [37] defined several classes of properties for which security analysts should watch
out when performing contract audit. Several groups of researchers [32, 207, 208, 210, 212] proposed
design patterns for smart contracts, which are general and reusable solutions for specific tasks.
In this survey, we look beyond the security aspect and aim to provide a general taxonomy of
domain-specific properties, which may also impact the correctness, privacy, efficiency, and fairness
of smart contracts. We are also interested in establishing the links between the various types of
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properties and the formalism used in supporting them. We believe that this effort can help identify
the gaps between the analysis needs and the existing technology capability.
We observe a consensus from the previous surveys that specifications for smart contracts are
of paramount importance, but how to properly derive and represent them still remains an open
challenge. This impacts not only the development of safe smart contracts, but also their verification
and utilization [95, 108, 139, 201]. According to a recent survey on smart contract developers by
Zou et al. [224], best practices, standards, and provably safe re-usable libraries are listed among
the most desired improvements they would like to see to happen in the smart contract ecosystem.
While there are ongoing efforts towards this direction, such as the creation of curated datasets of
smart contracts [73, 89], we aim to facilitate the adoption of formal specification and verification
by contributing the results of our analysis as well.
We adopt the same holistic view of verification techniques and tools for smart contracts. Still,
our categorization of formal verification approaches is inspired by the previous studies on smart
contract verification techniques performed by Harz et al. [101], Di Angelo et al. [69], and Miller et
al. [145]. In this survey, we make the following novel contributions.
• A comprehensive survey of the state of the art with broader scope;
• A four-layer framework for classifying smart contract analysis approaches;
• A taxonomy of smart contracts specifications in various domains;
• Discussions on observed trends and challenges in smart contract development and verification.
2 A TAXONOMY OF SMART CONTRACT MODELING FORMALISM
This section presents the formalisms used for formal modeling of smart contracts in the literature.
The formalization approaches for smart contracts can be classified into two broad categories:
contract-level and program-level, based on the level of abstraction at which modeling and analysis
is performed. The contract-level approaches are concerned with the high-level behavior of a smart
contract under analysis and usually do not consider technical details of its implementation and
execution. The program-level approaches mostly perform analysis on the contract implementation
(i.e., source code) itself and thus are platform-dependent.
2.1 Contract-Level Models
In the contract-level analyses, smart contracts are viewed as black boxes which accept transaction
messages coming from outside, and possibly perform some computation based on them. This may
result in externally observable events and even irreversible alteration to the blockchain state. The
internal execution details and intermediate results are abstracted away in these types of models.
Essentially, the contract-level models are concerned with the following concepts.
• Users – together with their balance, the transactions they initiate and the associated parameters
such as the account addresses and the attached values. They can be any type of accounts which
interact with the contract of interest—a user account or another contact. Some papers [26, 52, 124]
also consider the choices of transactions made by users under different circumstances (i.e.,
strategies), as well as knowledge that is available to users at a particular moment of a smart
contract execution [18, 26, 106, 196].
• Contracts – characterized by a set of publicly accessible functions and the externally visible effects
of the function executions, e.g., changes of contract owners/balances, and emitted events/opera-
tions. As such, the behaviors of a contract are usually described by a set of traces [180], which
are finite sequences of function invocations (i.e., the executed operations [142]), and properties
are predicates on such traces.
A Survey of Smart Contract Formal Specification and Verification 5
• Blockchain State – including global variables referred to by the contracts and environment
variables such as the timestamps and block numbers. More generally, blockchain state may
also include the mining pool [8, 152] and the memory state of the contract execution environ-
ment [142].
The contract-level models are effective in expressing properties regarding the interactions between
smart contracts and the external environment, and they are usually defined in terms of process
algebras, state-transition systems, and set-based methods. The majority of such models are verified
using techniques based on model checking [8, 14, 18, 30, 138, 142, 146, 152, 158, 165].
2.1.1 Process Algebras. Process algebra [29] is a family of mathematical approaches used to describe
the behaviors of distributed or parallel systems in the form of interacting concurrent processes.
The observable behaviors of a smart contract are similar to that of a shared-memory concurrent
program [177] or a system with an interleaving mode [165], which makes process algebra a suitable
candidate for high-level behavioral modeling. Therefore, process algebra captures the interactions
between concurrently acting users and smart contracts. For these interactions, correctness can be
assured through a translation of a smart contract to one of the process-algebraic formalisms. An
alternative approach involves implementation of a smart contract in a process-algebraic domain-
specific language (DSL).
Given that users interact with an Ethereum contract by calling its public functions, Qu et al. [165]
and Li et al. [129] translate such functions from Solidity to process notations defined in Commu-
nicating Sequential Processes (CSPs) and a variant of an applied π -calculus SAPIC, respectively.
In case transactions are not atomic, the interplay between the functions invoked by different
users may lead to risk conditions, which are manifested by vulnerable sequence appeared in the
execution trace [165]. The authors of [129] identify violations of trace-level safety properties that
are commonly analyzed for token implementations, such as the immutability of the total number
of tokens in a smart contract. As an example, Figs. 3 and 4 demonstrate partial source code and a
CSP model of the Simple Auction smart contract, which is based on an example from the Solidity
documentation [7] and the Blind Auction smart contract provided in [143]. Within the contract,
each user is allowed to place his bid until the deadline is reached. After the auction is finished, the
highest bid is transferred to the beneficiary, while the unsuccessful bidders can withdraw their
bids. Alternatively, the auction can be canceled at the bidding stage. Since the users participate
in the auction by invoking functions of a smart contract, Figure 3 shows the Solidity implemen-
tation of two functions, namely, bid() and finish(). Following the approach adopted by the
authors of [129, 165], Fig. 4 represents each of these functions as a process: Bid(msg,blk) and
Finish(blk), respectively. The processes are specified in CSP#—a CSP-based formal language
of the PAT tool [186], which supports both process and programming constructs. Each process
describes the corresponding actions of a smart contract and its users in terms of CSP events as
well as changes in a smart contract state implemented via shared variables. Being a high-level
representation, the model abstracts low-level execution details, including that of the transfer()
function, with the corresponding events. Block and transaction properties are represented using the
msg and blk process parameters, similar to the globally available variables in Solidity. For brevity,
the model of user behavior is omitted.
A process-algebraic model of a smart contract is adopted by several domain-specific programming
languages. [34, 167]. Rholang [167] is a Turing-complete language for the RChain platform, which
supports concurrency and is based on the reflective higher-order process calculus ρ-calculus, a
variant of π -calculus. Smart contracts in Rholang are processes that are triggered by messages
from agents: users or other contracts. BitML [34] is a high-level smart-contract language for
Bitcoin, which is based on a process calculus with symbolic semantics. It is showcased in a series
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1 contract SimpleAuction {
2 enum State { Bidding, Finished, Cancelled }
3 State public state;
4 address payable public beneficiary;
5 uint public auctionEndTime;
6 address public highestBidder;
7 uint public highestBid;
8 mapping(address => uint) pendingReturns;
9 ...
10 /// Bid on the auction.
11 function bid() public payable {
12 require(state == State.Bidding);
13 require(msg.value > highestBid);
14 require(now <= auctionEndTime);
15 if (highestBid != 0) {
16 pendingReturns[highestBidder] += highestBid; }
17 highestBidder = msg.sender;
18 highestBid = msg.value;
19 emit BidIncreased(msg.sender, msg.value);
20 }
21
22 /// End the auction, send owner the highest bid.
23 function finish() public {
24 require(state == State.Bidding);
25 require(now >= auctionEndTime);
26 state = State.Finished
27 emit AuctionEnded(highestBidder, highestBid);
28 beneficiary.transfer(highestBid);
29 }
30 ...
31 }
Fig. 3. Solidity source code of Simple Auction smart
contract adapted from [7, 143].
//@@SimpleAuction@@
enum{Bidding, Finished, Cancelled };
var state = 0;
var beneficiary = 0;
var auctionEndTime = 0;
var hBidder = 0; var hBid = 0;
var pReturns[2256 − 1];
. . .
Bid(msg, blk) = if(state == Bidding && msg.value > Bid
&& blk.timestamp <= auctionEndTime){
if(hBid! = 0){
pReturns[hBidder] = pReturns[hBidder] + hBid;}
updateBid {hBid = msg.value;
hBidder = msg.sender ;} → hBidIncreased → Skip};
Finish(blk) = if(state == Bidding &&
blk.timestamp >= auctionEndTime){
endAuction{state = Finished;} →
transfer .beneficiary .hBid → auctionEnded → Skip};
· · ·
Fig. 4. A CSP# model of Simple Auction
smart contract.
of publications by Bartoletti et al. [26, 34] how security properties, as well as arbitrary temporal
properties, can be expressed and checked in BitML. To ensure correctness of a smart contract
under different scenarios, BitML also supports specification of user strategies. Furthermore, smart
contracts can also be soundly translated from BitML into transactions—a Bitcoin representation of
a smart contract. The behavior of contract users can also be partially defined in a Turing-complete
process calculus scl proposed by Laneve et al. [124]. scl models behaviors of a smart contract and a
user as a parallel composition, where a user acts nondeterministically, while the behavior of a smart
contract is determined by its execution logic. The scl models are in fact transition systems that
are summarized by a first-order logic formula describing the values of the objective function for
all possible runs and user strategies. Then, the game-theoretical analysis is performed to identify
strategies that help users maximize their profits or minimize losses.
2.1.2 State-Transition Systems. The behaviors of a smart contract can be naturally interpreted as
a state-transition system, and in fact, Solidity encourages contracts being modeled as state ma-
chines [3]. Some next-generation smart contract languages, such as Obsidian [63] and Bamboo [2],
follow a state-oriented programming paradigm which makes transitions between states explicit
and therefore provides better security guarantees. When it comes to verification, depending on
the properties interested, there are also a wide range of choices in modeling smart contracts as
state-transition systems. For instance, timed automata, Markov decision processes, and Petri nets
are used to capture the time, probabilistic, and multi-agent interactive properties of the systems, re-
spectively. State-transition models are typically verified by model checkers against contract-specific
properties, in addition to generic temporal logic properties such as deadlock-/livelock-freedom
(C.f. Sect. 4.1). Section 3.2.1 provides a discussion on how the violation of these properties can lead
to serious bugs. A variety of analysis frameworks already exist for the validation and verification
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of state-transition systems, e.g., BIP and cpntools, etc. Such verification capacities combined with
the ability to visually define a state-transition system make this formalism useful for smart contract
synthesis [142, 143, 225].
Petri net (PN) is a mathematical language used to describe behaviors of concurrent systems. Unlike
the aforementioned formalisms, it provides a graphical notation which portrays a system using a set
of alternating places and transitions. PN tools allow a user to visually specify a smart contract model
and simulate its possible behaviors. Similar capabilities of the Colored Petri net (CPN) extension
and the supporting cpntools toolkit are utilized for security analysis of a Solidity contract [72,
133]. These two techniques construct CPN models of a contract and its users—manually [133] or
automatically [72]—to identify if a vulnerable state of a net is reachable. The authors of [72] make
the simulation more realistic by additionally modeling the execution process of EVM, considering
gas consumption as well. The ability to visually define and execute a PN model also helps in
synthesizing smart contracts from user inputs. A framework by Zupan et al. [225] generates a
Solidity smart contract from a model defined as a PN workflow—a subtype of a PN describing
business processes. Similar to the discussed PN approaches [72, 133], Zupan et al. automatically
validate the model according to typical properties such as the absence of transitions that can never
be executed [72, 133, 225] or reachability of a final state [225]. Through the visualization and
validation of the model and its execution, a correct-by-design smart contract can be generated by a
user without prior knowledge of smart-contract programming. The authors expect the technique
to facilitate the application of smart contracts in use cases including supply chain [225] and legal
contracts [121].
For a similar purpose, several frameworks synthesize smart contracts from a specification defined
using industry standards for visual modeling, such as Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN)
and Unified Modeling Language (UML). Caterpillar [70, 134] and Lorikeet [70] translate BPMN
models, which describe collaborative business processes such as supply chain, to Solidity and deploy
them to blockchain. A Solidity implementation of a cyber-physical system is generated from a UML
state diagram in [86]. BPMN and UML notations provide the capabilities to specify proper access
control [70, 86], control flow [134], and asset management [70] in the generated contracts. Still,
despite being widely used in the industry, BPMN and UML lack well-established formal semantics,
which complicates the analysis of such models. A possible way to validate a BPMN model involves
translation to a formal language, such as PN, as performed by Garcia et al. [87].
Behavior-Interaction-Priority (BIP) is a layered framework used to model the interaction between
smart contracts and users. BIP models of smart contracts usually consist of two layers: the compo-
nents of the Behavior layer describe the logic of each smart contract as an FSM, while the Interaction
layer defines the principles of their communication [14, 153]. Translation of an FSM model, visually
defined in the FSolidM framework [143], to BIP and, then, an input language of a NuSMV model
checker, allows VeriSolid [142] to generate provably safe smart contracts (in contrast to UML-
and BPMN-based frameworks discussed earlier [70, 86, 134]). Figure 5 presents an FSM model of the
Simple Auction smart contract (Fig. 3), inspired by a model of the Blind Auction contract defined
using FSolidM [143] and VeriSolid [142]. The model in Fig. 5 depicts possible transitions between
three smart contract states: Bidding (B), Finished (F), and Canceled (C).
Timed automata (TA) capture the temporal behavior of a system. TA models allow measuring
the impact of time on the execution of a smart contract [8] or reasoning about time constraints,
which are essential in legal and commitment smart contracts [62]. Different from other approaches
based on BIP [14, 142, 153], Abdellatif et al. [8] build TA models of not only a contract, but also
its users, and a simplified blockchain mechanism, including mining of transactions in blocks. The
interactions between these components are analyzed by statistical model checking to evaluate
the chances of a successful attack on the contract. Andrychowicz et al. [18] use TA to describe
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C
bid
unbid
withdraw
finish
[now >= auctionEndTime]
B F
cancel
Fig. 5. A state-transition model of Simple Auction smart contract (Fig. 3) adapted from [143].
behaviors of parties in a Bitcoin timed commitment. Commitment protocols require participants
to exchange cryptographic keys before a stipulated time. To analyze correctness of this protocol,
the authors additionally equip each TA with a structure describing the party’s knowledge. The
blockchain structure is maintained by a special agent, who is also modeled as an automaton.
A way to reason about the nondeterministic execution of a smart contract involves modeling it
through probabilistic and multi-agent extensions of transition systems, such as Markov decision
processes or strategic and concurrent games [41, 52, 124, 196]. To account for all possible user
behaviors, Meyden [196] regards an atomic swap smart contract as a concurrent game. Both a
model and its properties refer to the strategies of the contract participant. The authors apply the
MCK model checker to establish correctness and fairness of a contract under the specified user
behaviors. Chatterjee et al. [52] pursue a similar goal, however, their analysis of a concurrent game
model is based on its objective function, similar to the scl process-algebraic technique [124]. To
certify fairness and correctness of a smart contract, the authors of [52] examine the expected payoff
of its users and potential incentives for dishonest behavior. Different from the game-theoretical
techniques, Madl et al. [138] capture the interaction between the users of a marketplace contract by
describing their behaviors as interface automata. The authors verify a composition of the automata
in a model checker to ensure that participants can successfully cooperate.
2.1.3 Set-Based Methods. Set-based modeling frameworks Event-B and TLA+ utilize set theory and
logic to formally specify systems, and have been applied on smart contracts as well. Analogically
to other formal languages, such as PN, set-based frameworks support the tools for model analysis,
making them useful in the implementation of correct-by-design smart contracts [31, 211] and
verification of the existing ones [223]. While efficient for checking of safety properties, set-based
formalisms lack the expressiveness to reason about progress, e.g., liveness properties. Although
TLA+ supports temporal logic for specifying liveness, this feature has not yet been used to formalize
smart contract requirements.
Models written in Event-B are discrete transition systems which were demonstrated to be a
suitable formal representation of a smart contract. Zhu et al. [223] automatically translate a contract
written in a subset of Solidity to an Event-B model for refinement and verification via the Rodin
platform. TLA+ is a formal specification language for concurrent systems. That allows Xu et
al. [211] to model behaviors of interacting participants of a legal smart contract. Although the
authors of [211] do not translate their TLA+ specification to executable code, they propose a set
of design patterns to protect them from common security vulnerabilities of smart contracts. In
general, the set-based correctness requirements for smart contracts specify values allowed to be
taken by contract variables [31, 223], possible states of contract participants [211], or the users
that are authorized to invoke contract functions [223]. Xu et al. [211] also verify whether events
representing the actions of contract parties are permitted according to the legal contract.
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2.2 Program-Level Models
The contract-level models are useful in reasoning about high-level interactions between the con-
tracts and external parties, but do not help much in understanding the internal details about the
contract execution. The latter is essential in establishing properties concerning the correctness
and security of smart contracts. The program-level models aim to provide a white-box view of the
target contracts based on lower-level representations, such as the source code, compiled bytecode,
as well as derived analysis artifacts including AST, data- and control-flow graphs.
The following are concepts that are relevant to this level of abstraction.
• Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) – representing smart contract source code (e.g., in Solidity) as hierar-
chical tree structures. It is often used to perform lightweight syntactic analyses on the contract
implementations.
• Bytecode [162] (or opcode) – written in low-level machine instructions, which are closely tied to the
execution environments (e.g., Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM)). Since bytecode is obtained after
compilation, it better reflects the machine-level specifics (e.g., gas consumption and exceptions),
but at the same time may lose important source-level information.
• Control Flow Graph (CFG) – a graph representation of all program paths which might be traversed
during execution. The CFG can be obtained from bytecode and is often used in static analyses of
smart contracts, such as symbolic execution and automated verification.
• Program Traces – sequences of instructions (usually in bytecode) and events collected from
executions at runtime. These traces reflect the exact behaviors of the contracts under specific
inputs, which can be used as a source for performing dynamic analyses and runtime verification.
The program-level models preserve low-level execution details, and are, therefore, widely used in
finding vulnerabilities and checking other security-related properties.
2.2.1 AST-Level Analyses. Smart contract analyses performed directly on ASTs or similar parse-tree
structures are limited to the checking of predefined code patterns [135, 191, 213]. For example,
Yamashita et al. [213] scan ASTs of Hyperledger Fabric [17] contracts written in Go to find dangerous
code patterns and library imports. Another AST-based analysis is successfully applied in checking
the compliance of a smart contract with respect to the ERC20 [198] standard by Chen et al. [54].
Moreover, AST can be used to facilitate lightweight pre-analyses: e.g., locating arithmetic operations
that may cause overflows or assertions [197], decoding the memory layout information to allow
deeper inspection [46], and performing systematic instrumentation, such as vulnerability checks,
to the contract code [10, 75]. Such pre-analyses can help improve the effectiveness and scalability
of the more heavyweight downstream analyses. For instance, AST is the natural abstraction of
smart contract code when it comes to statistical [131] and deep learning-based analyses [85, 109].
The obvious drawback of these purely syntactic techniques is that they do not necessarily respect
the operation semantics or the execution environment of smart contracts, thereby compromising the
soundness/completeness of the analyses. For example, the gas consumption plays an important role
in the functional correctness and security of Ethereum smart contracts, but is often neglected [135,
191]. To allow formore sophisticated analyses, ASTs are often translated to derive other intermediate
representations, such as CFG [10, 76], inheritance graph [76], and inter-contract call graphs [54].
2.2.2 Control-Flow Automata. Control-flow graph (CFG) is often used to describe the operational
semantics of a program. As the name suggests, CFG is a labeled directed graph where the graph
nodes correspond to program locations and the edges correspond to possible transitions between
the program locations. Thus, CFG can also be viewed as a type of state-transition system, except
that it more closely reflects contract program executions than the contract-level state transitions
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discussed in Sect. 2.1. CFGs of smart contracts are mostly constructed from the compiled code—
either EVM bytecode of Ethereum contracts [136] or WebAssembly (WASM) bytecode of EOSIO [4]
contracts [103, 166]. Still, recovering CFGs from low-level bytecode is non-trivial, at least in the
case of Ethereum. There are several reasons for this. First, EVM is a stack-based machine, therefore,
recovering the target address of a jumping instruction (destination of an edge) calls for context-
sensitive static analysis capable of tracking the state of stack [13, 50]. Furthermore, smart contract
execution comprises a sequence of function invocations and, often, calls to other accounts, which
demands inter-procedural and inter-contract analyses, respectively.
The types of analyses run on CFGs include control-/data-flow analyses and symbolic execution,
which have matured tool supports for traditional software programs. Some of these tools and
techniques are applied directly on the CFGs extracted from smart contracts, while others are
custom built to accommodate particular language features of contract programs. As one exam-
ple, Ethainter [47] performs information flow analysis to reveal composite vulnerabilities, i.e.,
reached only through a sequence of transactions, from traces of Solidity contracts. In order to
reuse the existing program analysis tool-chain, namely, Datalog and Soufflé, the EVM bytecode is
decompiled using GigaHorse [93] to recover the CFG with data- and control-flow dependencies.
The same tool-chain is also used by Securify [194] and Vandal [48] in vulnerability detection
after CFGs are constructed. In contrast, many custom symbolic execution engines have been built
to traverse CFGs and check for interesting properties along the way. Some of the most notable
ones include Oyente [136], Mythril [148], and Manticore [147]. These approaches are designed
to identify vulnerable code patterns [136, 147, 148], integer arithmetic bugs [80], honeypots [193],
gas-inefficient bytecode patterns [56], etc.
To allow specification and verification of custom properties, several tools support extensions
to CFGs with annotations. Annotary [206] extends Mythril [148] to also capture inter-contract
and inter-transaction control-flows. Solar [127] allows annotations to a smart contract with
constraints and invariants. SmartScopy [78] supports vulnerability patterns to be defined in their
query language based on Racket.
2.2.3 Program Logics. To rigorously reason about the correctness of programs, various forms of
program logic have been developed over the years, and some of them are successfully applied
on smart contacts. A program logic is a proof system with a set of formal rules that allow to
statically reason about behavior of a program [21]. For example, Hoare logic [16], rewriting logic,
and reachability logic [160] were used to prove correctness conditions (C.f. Sect. 3.1.2) for smart
contracts. An epistemic logic [106] describes the interactions between smart contract participants
in terms of their knowledge, which facilitates verification of commitment and swap protocols
(C.f. Sect. 3.2.2). A combination of authority algebra and FOL enables reasoning about trust and
accountability in a smart contract [67]. Correctness of smart contracts is also verified through a
dynamic logic developed for Java programs [9, 35, 36]. Finally, formalisms that are based on deontic
logic enable specification and verification of legal smart contracts, which are difficult to define
formally otherwise [121].
Hoare and reachability logics assist reasoning about smart contract correctness by different
formal techniques. Based on a formalization of EVM in Lem [105], Amani et al. [16] and Duo
et al. [72] defined a sound Hoare-style program logic of Ethereum contracts. In verification of
properties, however, the former approach relies on theorem proving, while the latter translates
a formal model of a contract to CPN for model checking. In other approaches based on theorem
proving, Hoare-style properties are verified for smart contracts written in Michelson [38]—a smart
contract language of the Tezos [90] platform, or Lolisa [215]—a formal syntax and semantics of a
Solidity language subset. Apart from the tools based on Hoare logic, K is a framework for design
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and development of language semantics based on rewriting logic [160]. K has been used to define a
complete executable formal semantics of EVM [160] and Solidity [113], and a formal specification
of an intermediate LLVM-like language for smart contracts IELE [115]. Properties that can be
automatically proved by K include pre- and postconditions as well as reachability claims that
are verified through matching logic. The expressiveness of K can be illustrated with a complete
formalization of an ERC20 token contract [111]. Despite different choices of a verification technique,
the aforementioned approaches are able to capture the dynamic aspects of smart contract execution,
such as the memory state and gas consumption.
Such verification systems are usually built upon formal semantics of smart contract languages,
e.g., EVM bytecode [16, 72, 105], Solidity [215], Michelson [38]. To make contracts amenable to
formal reasoning, developers equip smart contract languages with a logical foundation, such as
λ-calculus, and formal semantics [51, 179].
At the same time, smart contracts that are written or translated to Java can be verified using
a dynamic logic called JavaDL—a program logic for Java. A Java program annotated with JML
specifications is automatically translated to JavaDL by KeY—a framework for deductive verification.
While Hyperledger Fabric contracts written in Java can be verified directly [35, 36], Solidity smart
contracts are preliminarily translated to Java [9]. Dynamic logic can be seen as an extension of
Hoare logic and is also used to define an executable specification for smart contracts [173]. The
concepts related to dynamic logic are discussed in more detail in Sect. 3.1.1 and Sect. 3.1.2.
Some researchers consider logic-based languages to be particularly useful for the implementation
and verification of legal smart contracts [92]. A legal smart contract is a digitized representation
of a legal agreement, which typically includes deontic modality statements describing obligation,
permission, and prohibition of the parties. To capture contractual aspects, the authors of [92]
formalize a smart contract in a logic-based language called Formal Contract Logic (FCL). Azzopardi
et al. [28] propose a formal deontic logic with small-step operational semantics for Solidity smart
contracts [28]. Specifications defined in deontic and defeasible logics are discussed in Sect. 3.1.1.
2.3 Summary
The analyzed work illustrates different aspects of smart contracts that researchers focus on, together
with the appropriate formalisms. As such, the concurrent nature of smart contract execution is
captured by contract-level models based on process algebra and Petri net, while game-theoretical
structures are suitable for modeling a multi-agent environment. Contract-level models, and state-
transition systems, in particular, provide an intuitive way to outline high-level behavior of a
smart contract, which includes possible interactions with other contracts, users, or blockchain.
Still, the abstraction over the execution logic of a smart contract introduces a gap between an
original contract and its representation in a chosen formalism. On the other hand, program-level
representations give intuition about the lower-level details of the execution process. At the same
time, while bytecode-level modeling provides wide capabilities in terms of low-level reasoning,
e.g., about resource consumption, it also complicates specification of semantic properties related to
smart contract behavior [20].
3 SURVEY ON SMART CONTRACT SPECIFICATIONS
In this section, we review the literature on smart contract specifications. Requirements on smart con-
tract applications are usually specified as properties—statements written in some formal languages
about program behaviors. In Sect. 3.1, we survey the formalisms adopted in formal specification,
which can be categorized into the contract- and program-level specifications. In Sect. 3.2, we review
various types of properties (e.g., security and functional correctness) from different application
domains, observed in the published work under study.
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3.1 Formal Specifications for Smart Contracts
Similar to the modeling formalisms discussed in Sect. 2, we make a distinction between contract-
level and program-level formal specifications of smart contracts. This is in correspondence with
the traditional classification of model-oriented and property-oriented specifications, rooted from
temporal logic andHoare logic, respectively. We discuss contract-level specifications about high-level
contract properties in Sect. 3.1.1 and program-level specifications governing lower-level program
implementations in Sect. 3.1.2.
3.1.1 Contract-Level Specification. Contract-level specifications of smart contracts are expressed
in various types of logic. The most prevalent category is a family of temporal logics, which includes
linear and branching temporal logics and their dialects. Other logics include deontic and defeasible
logics, which help to define the rights and obligations of smart contracts’ parties in accordance with
a legal contract. As specifications in temporal [142, 188], dynamic [173], and deontic logics [45, 83]
capture high-level behavioral characteristics of a system, they are used to synthesize correct-by-
design smart contracts. Propositional and predicate logics usually convey factual statements about
the contract’s state over the traces.
Temporal Logics. Temporal logics express properties of a smart contract over time. The execution
logic of smart contracts often encloses time constraints, be it legal contractual clauses [62] or
ending time of an auction or voting contract [83]. As noted in [152], in relation to smart contracts,
the word “temporal” may refer to logical time considering only the order of events. Defined over a
sequence of states, temporal formulae constitute a suitable language to describe the behavior of a
state-transition system—a common formal representation of a smart contract described in Sect. 2.1.2,
which is then verified by a model checker.
The two key temporal properties are safety and liveness. Safety properties correspond to a
statement: “Nothing bad ever happens”, and are often used to express invariance. In addition
to general software properties such as deadlock-freedom, common safety properties of smart
contracts define permissible values of state variables, establish invariants over a smart contract
balance (C.f. Sect. 3.2.3), specify access control for functions, or define a possible order of events.
Liveness properties state that “something good eventually happens”. They characterize the
possibility of a program to progress, which, for a smart contract, is often reflected in its ability
to give away cryptocurrency. The primary liveness property is liquidity [34]–a security property
discussed in detail in Sect. 3.2.1. Other liveness properties specify the ability of a smart contract or
its users to eventually reach a particular desired state [138, 152], even considering different user
strategies [196]. Unlike a safety property, however, there exists no finite counterexample for a
liveness property. To make them amenable to symbolic analysis, some authors [155, 180] define
under-approximations of liveness properties that are checked on traces of a fixed length.
Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) is a fragment of first-order logic (FOL) which is used to define
properties over a linear sequence of successive states of a program. LTL properties describe
safety and liveness of transition-system models of smart contracts that are verified by a model
checker [14, 26, 30, 34, 146]. Temporal safety properties of the Blind Auction smart contract in LTL
proposed by Suvorov et al. [188] are depicted in Fig. 6. The properties are also relevant for the
Simple Auction smart contract, which is formally modeled in Section 2 (Figs. 3 and 5). Past-time LTL
(ptLTL) has a set of temporal operators that reference the past states of a trace and allow succinct
formulae for safety properties [44, 162]. For example, two ptLTL-based specification languages for
Ethereum [44, 162] support an operator previously, which refers to the value of a contract variable
before the transaction execution. The properties defined in these languages are then translated
to source-code assertions. To account for the nondeterministic execution environment of a smart
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(i) bid cannot happen after close:
G (close→ ¬F bid)
(ii) withdraw cannot happen before finish:
finish R ¬withdraw
(i) bid cannot happen after close:
AG (close→ AG ¬bid)
(ii) withdraw can happen only after finish:
A [¬withdraw W finish]
Fig. 6. Properties of an auction smart contract in LTL from [188] (left) and CTL from [142] (right).
contract, Abdellatif et al. [8] specify properties in Probabilistic Bounded LTL (PB-LTL). Probabilistic
properties in [8] estimate the probability of a successful attack on a name registration contract on
each step of a transaction lifecycle.
Computation Tree Logic (CTL) is a branching-time logic used to describe properties of a computa-
tion tree. In contrast to LTL, it represents all possible executions of a program starting from the
initial state. Still, CTL is also used to formalize the specification of an FSM representation of a smart
contract for model checking [138, 142, 152]. Figure 6 also illustrates a CTL formalization of temporal
properties for an auction smart contract proposed by Mavridou et al. [142]. As in LTL, various
dialects of CTL are used to formulate specific requirements of smart contract models. An extension
of CTL for Colored Petri Nets (CPN), ASK-CTL, is used to describe correctness of CPN models of
smart contracts [72, 133]. To reason about the quantitative aspect of time in a timed commitment
protocol, Andrychowicz et al. [18] use a Timed CTL (TCTL) language of the UPPAAL model checker
to define properties of the timed automata models. Probabilistic CTL (PCTL) properties of a Markov
Decision Process model of a selling contract measure the probability of one of the players to lose
a certain percentage of his wealth after a given amount of time [41]. Alternating Temporal (ATL)
and Strategic Logics (SL) are multi-agent extensions of CTL that allow quantification over agents’
strategies. They describe the behavior of a concurrent game model of an atomic swap [196].
Dynamic Logic. Dynamic logic allows formulating properties it terms of actions taking the termi-
nation of a program into consideration. The authors of [173] propose a DSL for smart contract
implementation based on properties written in Linear Dynamic Logic on finite traces (LDLf ). Owing
to a higher expressiveness compared to LTL, LDLf is used to directly define models of a smart
contract for model checking, instead of specification of its state-transition model in a separate
modeling language, such as Promela. Other applications of dynamic logic are related to deductive
verification of smart contracts in the KeY framework. However, the properties are formulated in
a smart contract as JML annotations [9, 35, 36] and are then translated to Java Dynamic Logic
(JavaDL) (C.f. Sect. 3.1.2).
Deontic and Defeasible Logics. Deontic logic is a division of modal logic operating over the concepts
of obligation, permission, and prohibition. As legal prose relies on deontic modality [121], deontic-
logic specification of a legal smart contract can bridge the gap between its legal semantics and
implementation [62]. However, deontic modality requires special treatment from the specification
perspective, as permission has no direct correspondence in many specification languages [28, 188].
To enable compliance checking between a legal contract and a Solidity smart contract, Azzopardi et
al. [28] proposed an operational semantics for contracts written in deontic logic. Besides, deontic
statements constitute one of the components of ADICO institutional grammar [65], which captures
institutional rules, conventions, and norms. Given a set of ADICO rules, a framework proposed
in [83], can generate a skeleton of a Solidity smart contract.
Defeasible logic is a non-monotonic logic which allows for so-called defeasible propositions, in
other words, exceptions to some of the rules. Such specifications contain a statement that regulates
superiority between the clauses of a contract, which helps to handle possible disputes and breaches.
The authors of [92] encode a smart legal contract that regulates a product license evaluation into a
set of logical rules in Formal Contract Logic (FCL)—a formal contractual language based on defeasible
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logic and deontic logic of violations. The authors note that such logic-based implementation can be
seen as an executable specification and, hence, facilitates monitoring.
Other Logics. We found several approaches that use other types of logic to describe contract-level
requirements for smart contracts. For example, Li et al. [129] analyze traces of a process-algebraic
contract model based on properties written in a fragment of (temporal) FOL. Temporal properties
over traces of a Scilla smart contract are formalized using Coq higher-order logic predicates and a
proposed temporal connective [178].
Unal et al. [195] use a formal role-based access control (FPM-RBAC) security model to specify
the behavior of a crypto-wallet smart contract in a 5G network environment. The specification
consists of role-based access control statements, generic constraints expressed in predicate logic,
and ambient logic constraints for location- and time-based access policy.
3.1.2 Program-Level Specification. A dual type of smart contract specification is defined at the
program level. In this section, we concentrate on Hoare-style specifications, which are often used
together with program logics (C.f. Sect. 2.2.3) or are instrumented in the actual smart contract
source code. Then, we review specifications that rely on predefined patterns of instructions and
events observed during smart contract execution.
Hoare-Style Properties. A Hoare-style property of a program c is captured by a triple |= {P}c{Q},
where P and Q are predicates on the state of a program and its execution environment [16]. P and Q
describe the state before and after the execution of c (if it terminates), respectively, and are referred
to as a precondition and a postcondition. An invariant here is a predicate that program c should
satisfy at all times during its execution. Generally, Hoare triples express partial correctness, while
total correctness requires proof of program termination. When applied to smart contracts, partial
and total correctness are often considered equivalent due to the gas mechanism of Ethereum: a
contract is guaranteed to terminate either successfully or due to an out-of-gas exception [16, 88].
A Hoare-style specification of a smart contract consists of preconditions, postconditions, and
invariants defined for its functions, loops, and the contract in general. Predicates in these statements
include storage and memory variables, environmental variables capturing block or transaction
information, events and operations emitted during the execution. Hoare-style properties, therefore,
can capture both vulnerable conditions and semantic correctness of smart contract functions.
For example, access control in smart contracts is often realized via a precondition check on the
identity of a transaction sender. As another example, postconditions are used to check if the
constructor has initialized the contract state properly [44, 204]. Hoare-style properties can be
specified using program logics (C.f. Sect. 2.2.3) and are often supported by verification languages,
such as Why3 [151, 220]. Alternatively, Hoare-style specifications can be defined as smart contract
assertions, that are analyzed by verification tools statically [10, 12, 15, 98, 114, 162, 183, 204] or in
runtime [44, 126, 185].
Many program logics listed in Sect. 2.2.3 enable Hoare-style reasoning about smart contracts in
theorem provers [16, 38, 128, 215]. The work in [16] demonstrates how this approach is used to
describe correctness of an escrow smart contract. To consider all possible invocations, the authors
also verify that any input that is not covered by a specification leads to a transaction being reverted.
Nehai et al. [151] define a Hoare-style specification of smart contract functions in the polymorphic
FOL of Why3—an instrument for deductive verification. The specification contains requirements for
both semantic correctness and lower-level operational details, such as gas consumption and the
ordering of array elements. Other techniques based on deductive verification [9, 35, 36] use the KeY
framework. In this case, the input consists of a Java smart contract annotated with Java Modeling
Language (JML) properties expressing pre-/postconditions, invariants, and modifiable variables
A Survey of Smart Contract Formal Specification and Verification 15
.decl uncheckedCall(u:Statement)
uncheckedCall(u) :-
callResult(_, u),
!checkedCallThrows(u),
!checkedCallStateUpdate(u).
(a) Unchecked Send
.decl destroyable(stmt:Statement)
destroyable(stmt) :-
!inaccessible(stmt),
op(stmt, "SELFDESTRUCT").
(b) Accessible Selfdestruct
Fig. 7. Patterns for “Unchecked Send”
and “Accessible Selfdestruct” vulnerabil-
ities detected by Vandal in [48].
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Fig. 8. An automaton for identification of reentrancy dur-
ing execution. Reproduced from [130] with permission.
of contract functions. The authors of [36], however, note the inability of their approach to handle
complex properties, including temporal, even if they are expressible in JML. JML specification
is also supported by Raziel [172]—a framework for the implementation of proof-carrying smart
contracts. Raziel supports JML for functional correctness annotations and Obliv-Java—for privacy
variable annotations. A proof-carrying code proposal for safe smart contract upgrade by Dickerson
et al. [71] also relies on a Hoare-triple specification.
Assertions that correspond to Hoare-style properties can be added to a smart contract by means
of Solidity. The language includes require and assert statements that can express a precondition
or an invariant and postcondition, respectively. require statements are widely used to validate
the input received from a user—the absence of such checks is known to be a source of serious
issues [49, 96]. To advance further program-based specification, several tools provide custom
specification languages [44, 98, 126, 127, 162, 184, 185, 204]. They support quantifiers [126], the
implication operator [44, 162], and auxiliary functions, such as sum, which refers to a sum of
values stored in a mapping [98, 126, 162]. The latter is useful in specification of financial smart
contract invariants, as shown in Sect. 3.2.3. To check semantic correctness of a smart contract,
VeriSol [204] translates a state-machine policy of a Solidity smart contract into Hoare-style
source code assertions. Therefore, it can identify an incorrect state transition and an incorrect
initial state in a smart contract. Apart from user-defined specifications, several tools detect smart
contract vulnerabilities by adding assertions to a smart contract automatically [10, 183]. Overall,
instrumentation of a smart contract code with the corresponding checks introduces a transparent
and consistent approach to smart contract specification. However, while intended to be side-effect
free expressions, source-code assertions generate executable code and, therefore, gas consumption.
Program Path-Level Patterns. Symbolic execution represents each program trace as a propositional
formula over symbolic inputs to a program required to follow this execution path. Based on a
contract CFG, this approach allows recognizing traces that contain problematic sequences of pro-
gram states and instructions. In smart contract verification, the existing applications indicate if the
contract is vulnerable [50, 80, 103, 136, 148, 155, 166, 222], gas-inefficient [56], or a honeypot [193].
Some authors encode patterns over instructions and flow- and data-dependency in verification
languages, such as Datalog, to certify contract security [48, 194] including the absence of gas-related
vulnerabilities [94]. Figure 7 presents patterns that correspond to Unchecked Send and Accessible
Selfdestruct [48] vulnerabilities. The topmost pattern detects a vulnerability if the result of an
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external call is not used to update a blockchain state or throw an exception, while the bottom one
detects a selfdestruct operation that can be called by an arbitrary account (C.f. Sect. 3.2.1).
While the pattern-based approaches discussed above operate on an EVM compilation of a smart
contract, Perez and Livshits [161] use Datalog to formulate vulnerable patterns over execution
traces retrieved from the blockchain. During fuzzing, ReGuard [130] compares an execution trace
of a smart contract to an automaton that captures reentrancy. The automaton is shown in Fig. 8,
where entry and exit correspond to an entry and exit of a function, and CALL is the corresponding
EVM instruction. Another common dynamic vulnerability detection technique identifies predefined
patterns of instructions in runtime [84, 137, 169].
Another type of path-level specification is based on events. Since the ERC20 standard specifies the
events emitted by contract functions, several techniques perform compliance checking considering
events too [58, 98]. Events emitted by a smart contract during its execution are analyzed for
compliance with business rules by Fournier et al. [81] and Molina-Jimenez et al. [146]. The former
specification ensures acceptable transportation conditions in a supply chain use case, while the
latter encodes clauses of a selling contract in terms of parties’ responsibilities. Shishkin [180]
formalizes functional requirements of an Ethereum contract as predicates over traces of events.
In addition, some publications adopt a different notion of events. For example, EthRacer [116]
identifies event-ordering bugs in smart contracts by comparing results of different permutations of
function invocations. Therefore, in this work, an event refers to a function call. The authors of [97]
verify serializability of smart contract execution by analyzing its traces of events, or transitions
between contract states. The corresponding property of being effectively callback free (ECF) is
satisfied if for all executions containing a callback there exists an equivalent execution without
callback that can start in the same state and end in the same final state. A vulnerable pattern of
events corresponding to actions performed by a CSP model (C.f. Sect. 2.1.1) of a smart contract
helps to detect an attack in its execution [165].
3.2 Properties Classification by Domains
Using the listed formalisms, specifications describe smart contracts’ functional correctness from
different perspectives. The considered aspects include the absence of vulnerabilities, respect for
privacy requirements, reasonable resource consumption, conformance to business-level rules,
fairness to users. This section begins with an overview of existing classifications of domain-specific
smart contract properties. Then, based on the property domains, we propose our categorization of
smart contract properties that we have frequently seen in the research literature.
Existing Smart Contract Property Classification. Several taxonomies were proposed for smart contract
vulnerabilities [24, 53, 96, 174, 213], with the first and, arguably, the most influential published in
2017 [24]. Section 3.2.1 overviews security properties that serve to protect a smart contract from
types of vulnerabilities included in these classifications.
Two other publications describe common classes of domain-specific properties for smart con-
tracts [37, 162]. These articles adopt dual forms of property specification: Hoare triples and temporal
properties, respectively. Nevertheless, their categorizations share several types, such as user-based
access control over contract functions and invariants over aggregated values of collections. In addition,
Permenev et al. [162] define transition-system types of properties for smart contracts and extend
invariants to a multi-contract setting. Some of these properties also resemble software design
patterns [207], which capture the recurrent problems in smart contract development, e.g., State
Machine, Access Restriction, Ownership [207]. Bernardi et al. [37], on the other hand, consider two
types of properties related to a cryptocurrency exchange. We review some of these properties
in Sect. 3.2.3.
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Our domain-based analysis of properties is also shaped by a catalog of smart contract application
domains proposed by Bartoletti et al. [32]. They divide smart contracts into Financial, Notary, Game,
Wallet, and Library types. In Sect. 3.2, we describe our findings on the properties that are common
for some of these types of smart contracts.
3.2.1 Security. Detection of security flaws in smart contracts received a lot of attention. Important
security properties studied by the research community include liquidity (“a non-zero contract
balance is always eventually transferred to some participants [34, 155]”), atomicity (“if one part
of the transaction fails, then the entire transaction fails and the state is left unchanged” [136]),
single-entrancy (“the contract cannot perform any more calls once it has been reentered” [175]),
independence of the mutable state and miner-controlled parameters [95, 202]. Security guarantees of a
smart contract also include proper access control [155, 194] for safety-critical operations, arithmetic
correctness [78, 114, 183], and reasonable resource consumption [40, 56, 94]. The similarity of a smart
contract to a concurrent object [177] suggests that some security guarantees can be derived from
checking for linearizability [116] and serializability[97] of its executions.
The violation of these properties leads to many well-known smart contract vulnerabilities. For
example, contracts violating liquidity are called “greedy”, implying that their funds cannot be
released under any conditions [155]. A smart contract violates atomicity if it does not check the
return value of a (possibly failed) external call operation, which corresponds to the unchecked
call vulnerability [95, 161]. The execution logic of a smart contract that is not independent of
environmental variables, e.g., block.timestamp, is prone to dependence manipulation [202] by a
miner, including the timestamp dependency vulnerability [136]. If the business logic of a smart
contract depends on its mutable state parameters, such as balance and storage, then it has the
transaction-ordering dependence (TOD) problem. TOD belongs to a class of event-ordering (EO) bugs,
which arise from the nondeterministic execution of blockchain transactions [116] and aremanifested
by different outputs produced by different orderings of the same set of function invocations [116,
202]. The authors of [116] use the notion of linearizability to identify EO bugs, including mishandled
asynchronous callbacks from an off-chain oracle. The violation of single-entrancy implies that
a smart contract is reentrant: provided with enough gas, an external callee can repeatedly call
back into a smart contract within a single transaction. In execution traces, reentrancy is also
identified as a violation of a serializability-like property [97], i.e., if the result of an execution
with external callbacks is not equivalent to that of an execution without. Missing permission
checks for the execution of a transfer or a selfdestruct operation make a smart contract prodigal
and suicidal, respectively [155]. The identification of a transaction sender through the tx.origin
variable is also considered vulnerable [48]. Integer arithmetics of EVM and absence of automatic
checks for arithmetical correctness make Ethereum contracts prone to integer and batch overflow
and underflow [78, 183]. Furthermore, the progress of a smart contract can be compromised by
gas-exhaustive code patterns [56, 94].
Many symbolic execution tools detect vulnerabilities by scanning for vulnerable patterns in path
conditions and traces derived from a contract CFG. For example, to identify timestamp dependency,
Oyente [136] checks if a path condition of a trace includes the timestamp variable. To detect
suicidal smart contracts, sCompile [50] checks whether, for the paths that contain selfdestruct,
the path conditions constrain on the timestamp, block number, or the address of the contract owner.
Maian [155] flags traces which transfer funds or control to an address not appearing in a contract
state, as prodigal. Scanning for vulnerable instruction patterns can also be done in runtime, for
example, to identify that a permission check relies on tx.origin [55].
He et al. [102] consider prodigal and suicidal contracts to be the most challenging to detect, as it
requires an ordered set of transactions. Indeed, if one sets the owner variable of a smart contract
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equal to his address, he can bypass the aforementioned checks in the following transactions. The
authors of [47, 49] call such vulnerabilities composite and detect them using information-flow
patterns. Other static analysis tools also detect patterns over the data- and control-flow of a smart
contract, capturing the necessary context-sensitive information. Figure 7(a) demonstrates a pattern
for an unchecked call vulnerability detection used by Vandal [48]. The pattern states that the return
value of the call operation should be used either to control the execution of the throw operation
or to perform storage writes. To prevent overconsumption of gas, static analyses infer the upper
bound on gas consumed by a function call [11, 40, 141, 151] or detect vulnerable patterns, such as
unreachable code [56], trivial conditions [15] or an unbounded number of elements [94] in loops.
Race conditions, such as TOD, are identified by static analyses as read-write hazards between the
executions of two [95, 114, 194] or several [202] functions. An EO bug caused by an asynchronous
callback could as well be prevented by a temporal property proposed in [178]: it demands the state
of a contract to remain unchanged until the response from an oracle is received.
As a liveness property, liquidity can be intuitively formulated in temporal logics [34]. Bartoletti
et al. [34] additionally extend its definitions to user strategies: the default, strategyless multiparty
liquidity, assumes the existence of a cooperative strategy to unfreeze funds. Liquidity can also be
compromised by DoS attacks, for example, Parity Multisig Wallet [190] lost its ability to pay users
as it delegated transfers to a smart contract that was destroyed. Nelaturu et al. [153] identify the
Parity issue as a violation of deadlock-freedom.
Since arithmetic issues are often caused by non-validated function arguments, their identification
is entrusted to pre- and postconditions [105, 115, 151, 160] and assertions [78, 183]. The (formally
certified [175, 220]) SafeMath [157] Solidity library implements similar checks via the require
statements. Source-code assertions are also a popular way to implement role-based access control
in smart contracts. For example, it is done via equality checks between the values of msg.sender
(the usage of tx.origin is considered vulnerable [48, 55]) and the corresponding contract variable,
e.g., owner [98, 162, 204, 206]. Functions with restricted access usually change the value of a
safety-critical variable, such as owner, or manipulate funds, e.g., transfer or mint tokens.
Reentrancy is one of the most studied smart contract vulnerabilities. Both static and dynamic data-
and control-flow analyses detect the violation of “no writes after call” and similar patterns [78, 79,
127, 135, 169, 194] (yet, this pattern is neither sound nor complete approximation of reentrancy [175]
and is considered a standalone property in [194]). A similar check is specified in terms of contract
operations in CTL [142]. While single-entrancy is verified statically using Horn clauses in [175], a
similar property is also defined in terms of instructions in the execution trace [130] (Fig. 8).
Finally, the inconsistency caused by reentrancy as well as other issues, such as flawed arith-
metics [126], can be detected through invariants. Such invariants are proposed for financial [106,
129, 162, 180] (C.f. Sect. 3.2.3) and voting contracts [154] (C.f. Sect. 3.2.4).
3.2.2 Privacy. Smart contracts that implement auctions, games, and lotteries select a winner among
the users who submitted their bids or moves. Blockchain transactions are publicly accessible, so
a malicious user can decide on his move based on the actions of other contract participants. In
a name registration smart contract, one can intercept the name chosen by another user from an
unconfirmed transaction and register his address under this name first [8].
To prevent exposure of user inputs in a smart contract by design, it is recommended to implement
cryptographic protocols, such as commitment [68] and timed commitment [33] schemes. The protocol
requires each participant to commit to a secret that corresponds to his input and should be revealed
in time—otherwise, the participant has to pay compensation. In general, the correctness of a
commitment smart contract is described in terms of the knowledge of each others’ secrets that
participants did or did not obtain as well as the corresponding changes in their balance. One
A Survey of Smart Contract Formal Specification and Verification 19
example of such a property is proposed by the authors of [18]: “if an honest Bob did not learn Alice’s
secret then he gained Alice’s deposit as a result of the execution”. Similar aspects are considered in
specifications of atomic-swap contracts, which allow two parties to exchange their assets atomically,
i.e., the swap either succeeds or fails for both parties [106, 196]. Alternatively, to prevent contract
participants from cheating, Sergey et al. [178] suggested formulating a property as a knowledge
argument over the prefix of observed execution history.
The transparency of the transactions and ledger data also makes smart contracts less applicable
to privacy-sensitive domains, such as healthcare and voting. Potential solutions for privacy issues
in smart contracts include the application of trusted management [118] or hardware [61, 218]. On
the whole, privacy-preserving smart contract is an independent topic of intense study, not covered
by this survey. Among these approaches, we distinguish two that enforce privacy guarantees by
allowing the corresponding annotations in smart contract code. To prevent data leaks, a smart
contract language zkay [184] supports variable annotations, which specify who is eligible to read
the value of a variable. Similar privacy annotations are supported by the Raziel [172] framework.
As a demonstration, a smart contract is implemented in the Obliv-Java programming language with
both privacy and correctness requirement annotations. Both tools utilize some zero-knowledge
proof protocols to certify that privacy is maintained in a smart contract before it is executed.
3.2.3 Finance. One of the key advantages of smart contracts is their ability to manipulate digital
assets, known as cryptocurrency. Smart contracts automate the execution of financial applications
that involve storage and transfer of funds, between users and contracts. Common examples include
wallets, banks, escrows, cryptocurrency exchanges, and crowdfunding campaigns.
Initial Coin Offering (ICO) is a method of raising funds by selling tokens—programmable assets
managed by smart contracts on blockchain platforms [59]. Analysis performed by Chen et al. [59]
demonstrates that 80% of ICOs are Ethereum-based smart contracts implemented according to the
ERC20 standard [198]. The standard describes an interface of a token contract, i.e., its functions
and events. Arguably, even this semi-formal specification gave rise to the application of formal
techniques to token contracts [27, 58, 71, 100, 126–129, 158, 162, 183, 187, 197] and development of
a complete formal specification of ERC20 in K [111]. Several tools focus on consistency checking
between a token implementation and a standard [58, 126, 127]. For example, TokenScope [58]
identifies inconsistency in the histories of smart contract executions, while Li et al. [126] formulate
a relevant set of invariants for several standards. Among other properties, several more tools [55,
100, 197] check whether the contract emits the events determined by a specification, which can be
expressed in a specification language proposed by Hajdu et al. [100].
Another common way to ensure validity of a token or other similar financial contract implemen-
tations is through correctness conditions for functions related to token transfers, e.g., transfer(),
transferFrom(), and approve() in an ERC20 contract. For example, preconditions and postcon-
ditions of the transfer() function typically assert the following statements: “the sender’s balance
is not less than the requested amount of tokens” and “the balances of both sender and receiver are
updated according to the provided amount” [9, 27, 114, 127, 128, 133, 160, 185, 187, 197]. To cover
the corner cases, some of the listed specifications explicitly state that balances of non-participating
users remain unchanged [185, 187]. Sun et al. [187] additionally check that the value to be transferred
is greater than zero, a crowdfunding specified by Kalra et al. [114] only accepts investments bigger
than a threshold limit, while Dickerson et al. [71] require user balances to be non-negative. The
latter property can be found in specifications of banking contracts [9, 115], while wallets usually
require the opposite: the authors of [50, 114] request a user to respect the limit of Ether that can
be transferred out of a contract within a transaction or a contract lifetime, respectively. A wallet
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specification by Kalra et al. [114] does not permit users to transfer funds to themselves, while
ERC20-K [111] allows self-transfers but considers it a special case.
Formal specifications of financial contracts often contain vulnerability-related requirements,
primarily, integer overflow and underflow that may occur during a transfer [9, 98, 115, 183, 187,
197]. Other potential issues include event-ordering bugs: the authors of [71, 116] show how an
unforeseen ordering between the invocations of approve() and transfer() allows a malicious
user to spend more funds than intended, and how it can be prevented by an invariant. Wang et
al. [202] detect an extended set of issues referred to as nondeterministic payment bugs, which include
dependence manipulation conditions. Other specifications address access control [195, 197, 206],
and sending funds to invalid addresses [50, 55]. To assert that a crowdfunding contract can pay
back all investors if the campaign is not successful, i.e., is not greedy, some specifications introduce
temporal properties [162, 178]. To ensure that a smart contract has enough funds to do so, Permenev
et al [162] require that the escrow’s balance must be at least the sum of investor deposits unless the
crowdsale is declared successful. Other temporal properties ensure that funds are raised only until a
cap [98] or a deadline is reached [162] or specify the order of states in a crowdfunding lifecycle
and a corresponding payment procedure [162, 188].
An encouraged way to ensure the correctness of financial operations is by specification of
invariants over a smart contract balance and an aggregation of user balances [98, 126, 129, 162, 187].
The most common invariant states that the sum of user balances is equal to tokenSupply [98, 126–
128, 162, 180, 183, 187, 197], where the balances of users are stored in a so-called bookkeeping
mapping variable, e.g., balances, and tokenSupply defines the total number of existing tokens.
Other token invariants establish the equivalence between sums of sender and receiver balances before
and after the function execution [15] or require the difference between the contract balance and the
sum of all participants’ bookkeeping balances to remain constant [199]. These invariants can also
certify correctness of inter-contract communications of a smart contract [49, 162]. For example, an
invariant proposed by Wang et al. [200] ensures correctness for an account that receives funds from
a smart contract: “the amount deducted from a contract’s bookkeeping balances is always deposited into
the recipient’s account”. To facilitate specification and verification of these invariants, several tools
identify bookkeeping variables automatically [58, 199] or provide support for a special sum function,
that can be applied to mappings and/or arrays [98, 162, 183]. Invariants are also used to express
that the value of tokenSupply is immutable, bounded, or does not decrease [15, 37, 128, 162, 197].
In addition, Bernardi et al. [37] consider invariants that apply to cryptocurrency exchanges, such
as proportional distribution of tokens: “one should not be able to exchange an asset worth nothing
with a positively valued asset”.
Fairness in financial smart contracts can be analyzed by statistical means: the authors of [41]
estimate the probability of money losses for a participant of a goods exchange protocol. In a game-
theoretical analysis of a crowdfunding smart contract, Chatterjee et al. [52] define the amount of
sold tokens to be an objective function. If its value can exceed the number of available tokens, the
contract is declared unfair.
The authors of [23, 122] define a set of properties for financial legal smart contracts, such as
derivatives. The authors of Marlowe [122] verify that all smart contracts written in this language
conserve funds, i.e., the money that comes in plus the money in the contract before the transaction
must be equal to the money that comes out plus the contract after the transaction, except in the case
of an error. A similar idea that money are neither created nor destroyed by a smart contract is
addressed in Move [43] by using linear resource types for assets. In Findel [23], the requirements
for financial derivatives include the following: “derivatives should be free of calculation mistakes”,
“errors caused by external sources should be handled properly”, “accidental swaps should be avoided
(i.e., the generated transactions and contracts have the intended issuer and the intended owner)”.
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3.2.4 Social Games. We associate the term social game with a class of smart contracts that reg-
ulate the participation and interaction of multiple users, according to some predefined game
rules. Examples of such applications include auctions [20, 52, 142, 178, 188], voting schemes [20],
lotteries [52], and games, such as gambling [9, 74, 114], rock-paper-scissors [35, 52, 178], and
Ponzi-like games [142]. The payout to each participant is automatically determined by the contract
source code, making the analysis of fairness even more relevant. Fairness of social games can be
compromised due to privacy issues which occur if participants see each others’ submissions on
blockchains (C.f. Sect. 3.2.2). In general, fairness specifications require user submissions to be valid
and properly recorded, after which a correctly determined winner receives his payout. While its
precise definition is subjective in the presence of several competing users [114], game-theoretical
techniques [52, 124] analyze utility functions of participants as a reflection of contract fairness.
The theory of mechanism design has also been applied in the verification of fairness properties of
game contracts [132].
Social games typically require each user submission to be accompanied by a participation fee,
be it a vote in a ballot [38], a bid in an auction [20, 52, 178], or a move in a game [114] (e.g., “a
minimum deposit is required to play the game” [114]). Besides, users should have the permission
to participate (“people may vote if they are registered voters” [83]), the choice submitted by a user
should belong to a set of possible values (“the vote goes for a registered candidate” [38]) and, in some
cases, submitted only once [114, 178]. Temporal properties are often used to assure that submissions
are made before a deadline (“people must not vote after the deadline” [83]) or before the results are
finalized (“bid cannot happen after close” [142]). Valid user inputs are to be correctly recorded by
a smart contract [38, 178]. As an example, in an auction contract specified by Sergey et al. [178],
the pendingReturns variable should store a mapping between each account and the sum of all
his transfers made to a contract. A specification of a rock-paper-scissors contract by Sergey et
al. [178] summarizes several of the listed requirements: “each player can only submit their non-trivial
choice once, and this choice will have to be a key from payoffMatrix in order to be recorded in the
corresponding contract field”. Correctness of recording in voting contracts can also be guaranteed
through the use of invariants over the number of votes [20] and individual user weights [126]. For
instance, Antonino et al. [20] check that the number of votes initially available is equal to the sum of
votes still to be cast plus votes already cast throughout the election process.
After user inputs are collected, it is the responsibility of a smart contract to determine the
winner and perform the relevant transfers of cryptocurrency. The developers of smart contracts
that choose a winner randomly, such as lotteries [26] and casino [116], should be aware of the
risks introduced by dependence on external oracles or randomization techniques, as discussed
in Sect. 3.2.1. To enforce a correct winner selection in a rock-paper-scissors contract, Beckert et
al. [35] encode the game rules in a postcondition of the corresponding function. The property of a
simple Ponzi-scheme contract, King of the Ether Throne [1], certifies that a user should always be
crowned after successfully sending Ether to the contract [142].
Upon the outcome finalization, most of the social game contracts transfer funds to some user,
whether he is a successful gambler [74] or an unsuccessful auction participant [178]. In that sense,
social games are similar to financial contracts with their properties and potential flaws. For example,
the specification of an auction contract proposed by Sergey et al. [178] ensures that the smart
contract does not send the funds arbitrarily and is able to pay out the unsuccessful participants:
“an account, which is not the higher bidder, should be able to retrieve the full amount of their bids from
the contract, and do it exactly once”. A similar liveness property is formulated by Shishkin [180]
for a DAO-like smart contract, stating that if some investor deposited some amount of money and
did not vote for any proposal afterward, then he will always be able to get a refund by calling the
corresponding function. There are also specifications describing different ways to guarantee that a
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smart contract is not greedy and has enough funds to perform the required payments. For example,
the owner of a casino in [74] is only allowed to withdraw from the pot when the bet of a player is
resolved. According to Beckert et al. [35], as long as the auction remains open, the sum of the funds in
the auction remains the same or increases but never decreases.
Smart contract specifications can also describe the principal rules of its execution. For example,
temporal properties that define the order of state transitions in an auction contract are shown
in Fig. 6. Another auction specification [36] states that the items belong to the auctioneer as long
as the auction is open and to the highest bidder after the auction is closed. Invariants for an auction
contract in [132] require that the bidder with the highest bid becomes the winner and the highest bid
becomes the clear price.
3.2.5 Asset Tracking. Supply chain is named to be one of the most suitable use cases for permis-
sioned blockchains [81]. A supply chain typically involves several interacting parties responsible
for production, transportation, and sales. Alqahtani et al. [14] describe the responsibilities of parties
in a fuel supply chain, e.g., “vendors must always maintain their production under the daily limit
and log it into the ledger”, “point-of-sales must always adhere to the price set by the regulators”, and
“once the point-of-sales receives oil, a payment should eventually be triggered”. Another common
requirement for supply chain contracts defines the acceptable transportation conditions, mainly,
restrictions on the temperature [81] and humidity [204, 225]. The authors of [204, 225] transfer
the contract into a failed state if a critical reading is received, while Fournier et al. [81] report a
violation if the amount of such readings exceeds a threshold within an hour.
The next group of asset-management smart contracts includes marketplaces, often the ones that
facilitate trading between suppliers and producers of energy resources [142, 151, 152]. Similar to
the properties of contracts from other domains, safety properties describe the correct execution
flow of a market by declaring the allowed and required chains of actions [142, 152], e.g., “if a user’s
payment has been received, then his bill is edited before the market closure”. Each marketplace contract
implements an algorithm that matches the received buying and selling offers [142, 151, 152]. Nehai
et al. [152] warrant a satisfactory solution by verifying that the algorithm implements a repartition of
energy proportional to payment and that once opened, the market will eventually be closed. Properties
from their later proposal [151] guarantee that the solution is optimal in the sense that it maximizes
the total number of tokens exchanged.
A common example of legal smart contracts is a license agreement [91] for product evaluation.
Its formal specifications [92, 107, 188] describe the rights, obligations, and prohibitions of a user
who participates in the evaluation. For example, one of the clauses states that the Licensee must
not publish comments on the evaluation of the Product, unless the Licensee is permitted to publish the
results of the evaluation. As discussed in Sect. 2.1, logic-based languages are practical for capturing
the legal modality of such contracts [92, 107]. Still, Suvorov et al. [188] encoded some of the clauses
in temporal logic—although there is no direct representation of deontic modalities, the properties
are still sufficient to identify a violation of certain contractual clauses. This approach also enables
description of common principles of a contract operation, e.g., that removal of a comment cannot
happen if nothing has been published. It general, formal representations of rights and obligations in
smart legal contracts were discussed with regard to various formalisms including deontic logic [28],
automata-based specifications [27], a domain-specific language based on LDLf [173], set-based
frameworks [31, 211], and some others. The authors of [146] verify the formal contractual model
of a data selling smart contract against typical contractual problems, such as clause duplication.
Several formal specifications exist for name registration smart contracts that manage domain
names or provide aliases to blockchain account addresses [8, 104, 140]. Most of them focus on
security analysis [8, 104], e.g., estimating the chance of a stealing attack [8]. On the contrary,
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Table 1. A (partial) summary of formal verification tools.
Verification Techniques Tools Selected References Total
Model Checking
NuSMV, nuXmv [14, 117, 138, 142, 152, 153, 195]
18
SPIN [30, 146, 158]
CPN [72, 133]
BIP-SMC [8, 140]
PRISM [41]
UPPAAL [18]
MCK [196]
Maude [26]
FDR [165]
Ambient Calculus [195]
LDLf [173]
Theorem Proving
Coq [19, 23, 38, 154, 156, 178, 187, 215]
20Isabelle/HOL [16, 88, 104, 105, 122, 128]
Agda [51]
Program Verification
Datalog & Soufflé [47, 48, 94, 161, 194]
42
Boogie Verifier & Corral [20, 98, 204]
LLVM & SMACK [114, 202]
SeaHorn [12, 114]
F* [40, 95]
KeY [9, 35, 36]
Why3 [66, 151, 220]
K framework [113, 115, 160]
Custom static analyses [15, 76, 82, 122, 141, 175, 179, 180, 183]
Symbolic &
Concolic Execution
Oyente [80, 136, 193, 222]
22
Mythril [148, 164, 206]
teEther [119]
Maian [155]
Manticore [147]
Runtime Verification &
Testing
ContractLarva [27, 74]
26
EVM* [137]
ReGuard [130]
SODA [55]
Solythesis [126]
ECFChecker [97]
Maksimov et al. [140] formulate a property regarding the functional correctness of a smart contract:
“the user can get an alias or a rejection after a number of attempts not exceeding a specified value”.
3.3 Summary
Smart contract properties express security requirements and semantic conformance in many forms.
Vulnerabilities are often detected through path-level patterns in control- and data-flow of smart
contract execution. In program-level representations, both vulnerable conditions and semantic
correctness of smart contract functions can be captured by Hoare-style properties. The correspond-
ing checks can as well be instrumented into the smart contract code, which, however, increases
the amount of gas consumed by a smart contract. Nevertheless, temporal logic is considered a
more suitable formalism to specify the multi-agent execution environment of blockchain [196].
Indeed, contract-level behavioral specifications usually employ one of temporal logics to formulate
temporal and probabilistic constraints and account for user strategies. The analysis of smart contract
properties outlined in Sect. 3.2 also proves that the execution logic of smart contracts often relies
on temporal conditions. However, as has been observed in Sect. 2.3, contract-level modeling and
specification techniques seldom consider low-level execution details.
4 SMART CONTRACT FORMAL VERIFICATION TECHNIQUES
This section discusses techniques, tools, and frameworks that are employed for verification of
smart contract models described in Sect. 2. We also discuss the capabilities of these verification
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techniques with respect to the properties outlined in Sect. 3. A partial summary of verification
techniques and employed tools is provided in Table 1.
4.1 Model Checking
Model checking is a well-established technique for automatically verifying a system model (with
finite states) against its specification. When applied to smart contracts, model checkers perform
verification of contract-level models, mainly transition systems, against a temporal logic specifi-
cation [8, 14, 26, 41, 117, 138, 140, 142, 152, 196]. We identified 18 verification techniques that are
based on model-checking, with 7 utilizing the capabilities of NuSMV and nuXmv model checkers.
The popularity of model checking is arguably caused by the suitability of both modeling and
specification formalisms to smart contracts description combined with the existence of established
automatic frameworks. Although model checking is successful in verifying systems of several
smart contracts or users [14, 138, 153], its limitations are induced by the input language of a model
checker and the state explosion problem [152].
Support of diverse transition systems and temporal properties (C.f. Sects. 2.1.2 and 3.1.1) help
model checking capture different characteristics of smart contract execution, such as concur-
rency [72, 133, 158, 165], nondeterminism [8, 41, 140, 196], or time constraints [18]. In addition
to verifying the functional correctness of one contract [117, 142, 152], model checking handles
systems of interacting smart contracts [14, 153] and users [138]. Furthermore, with specifications
expressed in temporal logic, model checking is able to verify liveness properties and properties
of progress, e.g., liquidity [34]. Model checkers, such as SPIN, additionally verify conventional
requirements of concurrent systems, such as deadlock- and livelock-freedom [30, 146, 158].
However, model-checking suffers from the state explosion problem, which requires the users to
apply abstraction techniques for smart contracts [26, 34] or assume a set of simplifications to its
execution [117, 152]. Furthermore, Nehai et al. [152] claim that precise modeling of the blockchain
environment is infeasible due to the limitations of the NuSMVmodel-checker input language. Indeed,
as it checks a high-level representation, model-checking approaches rarely consider the details of
smart contract execution on blockchain, such as the gas mechanism or a memory model. One of
the two identified exceptions includes a schematic model of blockchain behavior, such as mining of
transactions in blocks [8]. A more realistic model of smart contract execution is achieved by Duo
et al. [72] by combining CPN with a program logic for EVM bytecode.
4.2 Theorem Proving
Verification based on theorem proving involves encoding a system and its desired properties into
a particular mathematical logic. Then, a theorem prover attempts to derive a formal proof of
satisfaction of these properties based on the axioms and inference rules of the formal system. Unlike
model checking, which only verifies finite-state systems, theorem proving supports verification of
infinite systems [171]. On the other hand, theorem-proving techniques are usually semi-automated
and require human involvement and expertise. Nevertheless, this drawback discourages neither
academia nor industry from developing tools and languages that are backed by theorem proving.
Our study identified 20 applications of theorem proving used to derive correctness guarantees for
smart contract languages, individual smart contracts, and even verification frameworks.
Coq, Isabelle/HOL, and Agda theorem provers are used to develop formal semantics of low-
[16, 38, 51, 88, 106, 156], intermediate- [39, 128, 178], and high-level [113, 214] programming
languages for smart contracts, including DSLs for financial contracts [23, 122]. However, Li et
al. [128] suggest that, among them, intermediate-level languages are the most suitable for formal
verification. Annenkov et al. [19] note that the authors of formal semantics often focus on meta-
theory, i.e., verification of language properties, as in case of Plutus Core [51] or Simplicity [156].
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Established through its formal semantics, general properties of Marlowe [122] smart contracts
include a bound on transactions that a contract can accept and preservation of money within the
contract.
ConCert [19] is a Coq-based framework, which allows both meta-theoretic and functional
reasoning about a (functional) language and a smart contract, respectively. Together with other
publications [16, 19, 23, 38, 122, 128, 154, 215], it illustrates how theorem proving helps to precisely
describe and prove correctness conditions of smart contract execution. These conditions include
Hoare-style correctness properties over the state of a smart contract and its environment [16, 38,
128, 215], security requirements [23, 187], and gas consumption reasoning [88].
Despite the potential expressiveness of theorem-proving approaches, they seldom consider inter-
contract communication and temporal properties of smart contracts. An attempt to examine smart
contract interactions in Coq is performed by Nielsen and Spitters [154], who prove a voting contract
invariant which approximates a temporal property. Verification of temporal properties, including
liveness, in Scilla smart contracts, is enabled by a formalization of its trace semantics [178], while
an embedding of the language in Coq is under development [179].
4.3 Symbolic Execution
Symbolic execution executes a program symbolically and thus is able to explore multiple concrete
execution paths at a time. Symbolic execution of both Ethereum and EOSIO smart contracts is
based on a traversal of a CFG reconstructed from the bytecode of a smart contract [103, 136].
Thereby, this approach inherits the difficulties associated with the issues of precise CFG modeling
in smart contracts (C.f. Sect. 2.2.2). Other difficulties encountered in symbolic execution for smart
contracts include heavy usage of hash functions (hard to be solved by SMT solvers) and the need to
symbolically model memory and smart contract interactions. Similar to model checking, symbolic
execution approaches usually explore paths up to a certain length, which calls for the application
of abstract interpretation and partial-order reduction. Nevertheless, symbolic execution is one of
the principal approaches to detect smart contract vulnerabilities: overall, we found 22 applications
of symbolic and concolic executions. For solving path constraints, nine-tenths of these techniques
rely on an off-the-shelf constraint solver Z3, however, Frank et al. [82] show that other solvers,
especially Yices2, significantly outperforms Z3. Symbolic execution is also used to guide smart
fuzzing approaches [102].
In most cases, symbolic execution is used to detect predefined vulnerable patterns in the bytecode
level. For example, that is performed by primary symbolic-execution tools that include Oyente [136],
Mythril [148], and their extensions [80, 164, 193, 222]. EOSafe [103] verifies EOSIO smart contracts
against a set of predefined vulnerabilities. teEther [119] examines execution paths of interest
that contain a vulnerable instruction pattern and generates exploits to confirm the vulnerabilities.
To extend verification capabilities beyond predefined patterns, SmartScopy [78] and Solar [127]
provide support for user-defined vulnerable patterns and constraints, respectively.
Inter-transactional verification helps to uncover smart contract vulnerabilities that are composite,
i.e., the vulnerability can only be exploited through a sequence of transactions [47]. However,
symbolic execution suffers from the path explosion problem, whichmakes them unsound and unable
to explore all possible sequences due to complex constraints. Therefore, most of the techniques,
e.g., Maian [155], bound the invocation depth—the length of a considered sequence of transactions.
VerX [162] combines symbolic execution with abstract interpretation and models gas mechanics
of Ethereum, which allows elimination of the paths that are unreachable due to an out-of-gas
exception. The tool checks reachability of assertions inserted in the smart contract source code from
the temporal properties defined by a user. VerX also supports verification of a bundle of interacting
smart contracts, which is rarely addressed by static analyses.
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4.4 Program Verification
Smart contract correctness and security are verified by a wide range of program verification
techniques, which total to 42 publications. The most numerous category among these techniques
employs existing verification languages supported by verification frameworks, e.g., Boogie, LLVM,
Datalog, or F*. Many of program verification tools are automated [76, 175, 183, 194] and can
check for composite vulnerabilities [47] and semantic correctness of a smart contract [204]. The
issues associated with program verification (especially static analysis) include the need to precisely
abstract components of smart contract execution and memory model [20, 99, 175], while the
abstraction is often unsound [175]. Although static analysis tools often do not consider the gas
mechanics of smart contract execution [20, 114, 175], others specifically focus on the estimation of
gas consumption [11, 141].
Translation of the smart contract source code into verification languages enables the wide
capabilities of their toolchains. For example, data- and control flow analyses by Datalog and its
Soufflé engine successfully detect vulnerabilities in bytecode [47, 48, 94, 194] and execution traces of
Ethereum [161] smart contracts. Translation of Solidity—a high-level language—to Boogie enables
verification of Hoare-style semantic properties [20, 204] and secure compilation of annotated smart
contracts [98]. LLVM was shown to be a suitable IR for EVM [202], Solidity [114], and Go [114]
implementations to check for both vulnerabilities and semantic conformance. Bhargavan et al. [40]
performed embedding of both a Solidity subset and EVM bytecode in F* to allow verification of
both high-level correctness and low-level properties, e.g., related to gas consumption. Translation
of Solidity [151], EVM [220], and Michelson [66] smart contracts to WhyML enables deductive
verification of Hoare-style properties. The authors of [151] note that this technique facilitates the
evaluation of a smart contract in a more realistic setting compared to model checking [152], which
suffers from state explosion. However, unlike model checking [152], it does not allow specification
of liveness properties. Deductive verification of smart contracts written or translated to Java w.r.t.
Hoare-style properties is performed by the KeY framework [9, 35, 36]. A correct-by construction
deductive verifier for EVM bytecode has been generated in the K framework [160].
Although several of the above-listed approaches [114, 194] make soundness claims, Schnei-
dewind et al. [175] demonstrate sources of unsoundness identified in these analyses. The authors
of [175] propose a provably sound Horn-clause abstraction for EVM bytecode based on an EVM
formalization [95] for reachability analysis, which enables verification of both security and func-
tional Hoare-style properties. Other static analyzers support reasoning about execution traces [58]
and smart contract written in Scilla [179], Solidity [15, 76, 180, 183] or EVM bytecode [175], and
Tezla [168].
Besides, the publications under study actively apply program verification tools that are specifically
designed to operate over particular formalisms, such as set-based frameworks TLA+ [211] and
Event-B [31, 223], a defeasible logic engine SPINdle [92] for logic-based programs, Tamarin prover
for verification of concurrent protocols, C-language verifiers [12].
4.5 Runtime Verification and Testing
Runtime verification is a lightweight verification technique that checks the properties of a running
program. Different from the techniques described in previous sections, runtime verification is
concerned with one execution trace at a time. In the domain of smart contracts, the term trace
often denotes a sequence of instructions executed by a blockchain platform, while it can also refer
to a sequence of function invocations or events emitted by a smart contract. The availability of
runtime information helps dynamic verification techniques mitigate one of the main obstacles
to smart contract analysis—the need to model a complex execution environment of blockchain.
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Runtime verification usually provides a reactive defense against vulnerabilities or violations of
correctness at runtime and can potentially identify vulnerable states that could not be reached by
model checking or symbolic execution, due to the state or path explosion. Approaches based on
runtime verification and testing, including fuzzing, account for 26 publications in our dataset.
Most of the runtime verification techniques perform verification on-chain, which allows them
to reject vulnerable transactions acting as an online defense system. The approaches are based
on enhancing the source code of a blockchain client [55, 79, 84, 97, 169] or a smart contract
itself [10, 27, 28, 44, 126, 185]. Both Go and JavaScript Ethereum clients enhanced with monitoring
strategies and/or taint analysis are able to detect predefined vulnerable patterns in the instruction
trace [84, 97, 137, 169]. Ægis [79] and SODA [55] additionally support verification of user-defined
patterns, which can, for example, indicate an inconsistency between a contract and a corresponding
standard. Still, the discussion on the false positives produced by SODA [55] shows that although
the tool can access runtime information, its completeness is still subject to the precision of the
detection patterns. Another obstacle to wide adoption of such instrumented clients in Ethereum
arises from the fact that it would require a hard fork of all EVM clients [126].
Another group of runtime approaches prevents vulnerabilities by inserting protection code
into the source code of a smart contract [10, 27, 44, 126, 185]. For example, Solythesis [126]
automatically instruments a Solidity smart contract with custom invariants. Compared to Solidity,
its specification language for invariants contains additional features, including quantifiers and
sums. Azzopardi et al. [28] instrument a smart contact with monitors that verify the compliance
between a smart contract and a legal contract. However, the assertions generate additional gas
consumption during the execution of an instrumented smart contract [126]. Another limitation of
this approach is caused by the infeasibility to formulate and verify complex temporal properties,
including liveness, using such smart contract instrumentation. While the above-listed tools perform
on-chain verification, events emitted during the execution of a Solidity or a Hyperledger Fabric
smart contract can also be checked for compliance off-chain [81, 146].
Besides runtime verification, smart contracts can be dynamically verified via fuzzing and testing
techniques to identify and exploit vulnerabilities [112, 130, 199]. To navigate a fuzzer towards higher
path coverage, some authors combine fuzzing with taint analysis [219] and symbolic execution [102,
116, 192]. Symbolic execution is also used to guide invariant-based testing of a smart contract by a
federated society of bots [197].
4.6 Other Techniques
Lightweight smart contract analyses include lexical and syntactical checks on Solidity source code
and its tree-like structures [135, 191, 213], which detect vulnerable code patterns.
An emerging line of research is focused on the application of statistical and deep learning-based
techniques to smart contract verification. One of the first proposals in this domain [131] identifies
vulnerable smart contracts as containing irregular token sequences w.r.t. a statistical language
model of Solidity. Tann et al. [189] use recurrent neural networks to measure the similarity of
smart contract opcode to that of vulnerable smart contracts flagged by Maian [155]. Other machine-
and deep-learning analyses are also used to identify vulnerable smart contracts [203], detect Ponzi
schemes [60] and code clones [85], or propose code updates [109]. Additionally, machine-learning
techniques help Chen et al. [54] identify whether an access control check in a smart contract
function is missing.
4.7 Summary
The choice of a verification technique largely depends on the type of a formalmodel and specification
that one aims to analyze. Temporal properties are typically verified by a model checker w.r.t. a
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contract-level model of one or several interacting smart contracts. Vulnerable patterns in the
CFG of a smart contract are identified by symbolic execution techniques. Program verification
approaches perform (often unsound) translation of a smart contract to a verification language,
which enables data- and control-flow analyses to uncover composite vulnerabilities. Despite a high
level of complexity associated with theorem proving, it is actively used to precisely specify and
verify correctness of smart contracts (usually expressed in Hoare triples), programming languages,
and verification frameworks. As an alternative to static analyses, a smart contract can be verified
in runtime, which involves modification of a blockchain client or a smart contract itself. This
approach enables rejection of non-compliant transactions in runtime but may introduce gas or
runtime overhead.
5 DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we discuss our observations on the formal verification and specification literature
of smart contracts, to formulate answers to the research questions raised in Sect. 1.1. Some key
observations are also summarized in Table 2.
5.1 Results
With RQ1, we aimed to identify formalisms which are currently used in the modeling and specifi-
cation of smart contracts, as well as approaches to their verification. Through our study, we made
the following observations. (1) Among contract-level representations, the dominant combination
is state-transition models with specifications in temporal logic, which are then verified by model
checkers. As seen from Table 2, this combination is mostly used to formulate functional correctness
properties, and some security properties involving the concept of progress, such as liquidity [34],
are modeled as liveness. (2) Another popular approach is automated program-level verification
against Hoare-style specifications. In terms of functional correctness, program logics defined at the
bytecode-level allow the reasoning about smart contract behaviors using theorem provers, while
source-level annotations are usually discharged by program verification techniques. Verification
of security properties is dominated by existing well-established symbolic execution and program
verification tool-chains, e.g., Boogie. With a few exceptions, these approaches identify security
issues along program paths that match predefined vulnerable patterns. (3) Runtime verification
checks for similar issues but on runtime execution traces. These techniques often require instru-
mentation of smart contract code with proper monitors, e.g., assertions. Runtime monitoring can
also be implemented off-chain with tracking of events for compliance checking for escrow and
supply chain applications [81, 146].
5.2 Open Challenges
With RQ2 and RQ3, we aimed to identify current challenges and limitations in formal verification
of smart contracts, respectively.
Pattern-Based Verification. As demonstrated in Table 2, smart contract security analysis is mostly
performed at the program level. These techniques typically rely on vulnerable patterns that were de-
fined by experts, which limits these tools to the identification of a known set of vulnerabilities [202].
The generalization to larger classes of vulnerabilities can be achieved by focusing on the root causes
of bugs, such as the influence of nondeterministic factors on smart contract execution [202]. To
expand the list of detectable vulnerabilities, some works propose specification languages which
allow users to define vulnerabilities [78], temporal properties [162], or annotate Solidity contracts
with requirements, in forms of invariants [98, 200].
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Table 2. A (partial) overview of the formalization and verification literature.
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Limited Verification of Temporal Properties. Temporal logic is used as a universal formalism for
high-level correctness specification for smart contracts. In nearly all cases, temporal properties are
specified over a contract-level model of a smart contract, which typically abstract technical details
of its operation. At the same time, program-level techniques that provide better precision in terms
of the execution environment modeling rarely support specification and verification of temporal
properties. Nevertheless, the wide use of temporal properties in smart contract specification suggests
that they should be analyzed to the precision of program-level techniques.
Complications in Execution Environment Modeling. Arguably, the major difficulty of all techniques
that perform static analyses lies in the modeling of intricate aspects of smart contract execution,
which also differ across platforms. For example, a verifier for Ethereum smart contracts should
precisely model the gas mechanism [162] and the memory model [20, 82, 99] with its hash-based
object allocation [162]. Gas consumption in Ethereum is determined by the executed instructions at
runtime, so gas-aware analyses have to be carried out at the bytecode-level, which makes specifica-
tion of high-level properties less straightforward [20]. Precise reasoning about temporal properties
concerned with physical time is also complicated by the absence of a global clock [52] and the delay
in transaction processing [145]. Besides, the execution of Ethereum contracts introduces many
sources of nondeterminism, including transaction ordering and the fallback mechanism [202], only
determined at runtime. Still, comprehensive verification of functional correctness and security of
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smart contracts should allow for inter-contractual reasoning [119], which accounts for a nondeter-
ministic behavior of an external callee. Other aspects of blockchain that require modeling include
the possibility of forks [25, 106] and reverted transactions.
Limitations of Runtime Verification. Since smart contracts are immutable once deployed, the discussed
techniques are mostly to be applied in design-time. Even in the domain of runtime verification,
many techniques [27, 28, 44, 126, 185] rely on the instrumentation of contracts with protecting
code, which has to be performed pre-deployment as well. Moreover, instrumentation introduces
additional gas consumption [126] and increases the size of bytecode, which is limited [55]. Runtime
verification of smart contracts is also performed through the application of instrumented Ethereum
clients [55, 84, 97, 137]. They, however, can only operate locally—otherwise, a hard fork is required
for its integration into a platform [126]. In case the information about the execution is retrieved
from the blockchain, information about private contract variables may not be observable [197].
Furthermore, if transactions are analyzed offline, suspicious transactions cannot be reverted in
runtime [55].
Fragmented Standards and Ecosystems. Despite the extensive literature, there is still not a clear
path towards safe smart contract development [224]. This is particularly reflected by the lack of
standard development tool-chains and the difficulty in choosing the right techniques. Arguably, the
difference between the chosen formal specification and verification techniques as well as different
threat models are the key reasons for a low agreement between smart contract verification tools
demonstrated by recent studies [161, 202]. In addition, our observations coincide with the opinion
of He et al. [103] that smart contracts operating on different platforms require substantially different
approaches to specification and vulnerability detection. Although Table 2 demonstrates that a vast
majority of approaches concentrate on verification of Ethereum smart contracts, our study includes
the work on Bitcoin [18, 26], Tezos [38, 39, 168], Hyperledger Fabric [14, 36, 81, 114, 138, 173, 213],
EOS [103, 125, 166].
5.3 Future Directions
We envision a few promising research directions in the area of formal specification and verification
of smart contracts.
Safe Languages. One of the emerging directions is to develop safe smart contract languages which
eliminate many security risks by design. For example, Tezos supports three formally certified
programming languages varying in platform abstraction level [38, 39, 168], shipped with associated
verification frameworks. Besides formal semantics, other guarantees are derived from linear resource
types in Move [43] and Flint [176], explicit state changes of Bamboo [2] and Obsidian [2, 63],
functional programming principles and a restricted instruction set in Scilla [179], user-centered
design as in Obsidian [63], etc. We also noticed an increasing number of domain-specific languages,
for example, Marlowe [122, 123] and Findel [23, 42], which should simplify the development and
verification of financial smart contracts.
Self-Healing Contracts. Another prominent direction is concerned with recovering from runtime
failures/violations, a.k.a. automated repair of contracts. In 2017, Magazzeni et al. [139] suggested
that AI planning techniques can be used to automatically patch the misaligned traces of smart
contracts. One of the recent examples is an automated gas-aware repair technique for Ethereum
smart contracts proposed by Yu et al. [217], which is based on a genetic mutation technique guided
towards lower gas consumption. The ability of a smart contract to recover from a violation could
also be relevant in the context of smart legal contracts, e.g., to resolve disputes and conflicts between
participants of a contract [64].
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Hybrid Analyses. In the verification of smart contacts, better results can be achieved through a
combination of online and offline techniques [55, 126]. Besides, a combination of contract-level
and program-level approaches to smart contract modeling can help mitigate the trade-off between
the high-level behavioral specification and the precise modeling of execution details. Filling in the
gap between high- and low-level analyses can enable accurate verification of interesting temporal
properties. The study of smart contract fairness is complicated by the multi-user environment of
its execution model and unknown intentions of contract designers. Still, to analyze such high-level
properties, including fairness, researchers currently apply techniques from the domains of game
theory and mechanism design [52, 124, 132].
Collaborative Development of Standards. Some work has been done to promote standards and
best practices in the development of smart contracts, for example, collections of design and se-
curity [207, 208, 212] patterns. Two recent publications provided taxonomies of common smart
contract properties and invariants [37, 162], while the authors of [96] summarized their observa-
tions on the performance of static and dynamic analysis tools w.r.t. different security issues. The
adoption of formally verified libraries is another step towards safer smart contract development.
Two recent works [175, 220] used formal verification to assure the safety of the popular SafeMath
library for Solidity. Other contributions include creation of a benchmark and curated datasets
of vulnerable smart contracts [73] as well as evaluation frameworks for static analyses based on
vulnerable code injection [10, 89]. The development of standard benchmark is facilitating advances
in the ML/DL approaches to smart contract analysis—another trend in smart contract analysis that
we observed in recent publications. We expect the work in this direction to continue.
6 CONCLUSION
In view of the increasing adoption of blockchain and smart contract technologies, formal specifica-
tion and verification of smart contracts has been an active topic of research in recent years. Within
this survey, we have presented a comprehensive analysis and classification of existing approaches
to formal modeling, specification, and verification of smart contracts. Furthermore, we outlined
common properties from different smart contract domains and correlated them with the capabilities
of existing verification techniques. A holistic perspective on smart contract analysis, which was
adopted in this survey, allowed us to uncover the existing limitations to effective formal verification
of smart contracts and suggest future research directions.
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